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I.  INTRODUCTION 
A.  THE ROYAL THAI GOVERNMENT AND INCOME DISTRIBUTION 
On 21 October 1992, Prime Minister Chuan Leekpai 
delivered policy statements to the Parliament before his newly 
elected government officially began its work. The statement 
covered several topics, including distribution of wealth and 
prosperity to regional and provincial areas. The prime 
minister acknowledged that although his predecessors had 
accomplished an admirable task in maintaining Thailand's 
relatively high economic performance, most of the economic 
activities had been concentrated within the capital city of 
Bangkok and its vicinities. His new government, therefore, was 
determined to bring the fruits of economic development to the 
majority of the Thai citizens.[Ref. 1] 
The above policy seems to suggest that the new government 
has pledged to devote itself to reducing inequality between 
the urban rich and rural poor. However, one who is familiar 
with Thai politics will discover that a similar policy has 
been read to the Parliament time after time by virtually every 
government. In fact, the country's first economic development 
guideline, the National Economic and Social Development Plan, 
covering 1961 to 1966, asserts the importance of equitable 
distribution: "increased output should be equitably 
distributed so that, to the extent possible, all citizens, and 
not merely a privileged few, derive benefit from it." 
[Ref. 2] The succeeding plans, counting at seven up to this 
moment, also place income distribution at the top of their 
priorities. 
Whether or not these policies and plans have been 
effectively implemented is rarely brought up in public. As a 
result, statistics concerning the country's inequality are 
quite limited and difficult to verify, especially prior to 
1980. Furthermore, the issue of income distribution only 
gained public attention after Thailand experienced an economic 
boom in the second half of the 1980s. There is no clear 
explanation for the lack of public awareness. However, culture 
and tradition, religious belief and a "top-down" social 
structure, which have all been passed on from generation to 
generation for over seven centuries, certainly play major 
roles in this phenomena. Since the economic boom began in 
1987, the question of who actually benefits from the fast 
growth has been increasingly raised by the public, 
particularly the rural poor. Some politicians and academics 
have constantly expressed their concern over the issue and 
even fear that the inequality might worsen to the point where 
social tension is unbearable. "We are going to have a 
revolution by the people if the widening gap between the rich 
and poor is not closed," a leading politician once said 
[Ref. 3]. 
B.  RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND OUTLINES 
This study intends to address three research questions: 
1. What are common patterns of income distribution that 
most developing countries share during the course of economic 
development? 
2. Has economic development in Thailand, particularly 
during the fast growth period of 1987-1990, aggravated the 
country's income gap between the rich and poor? 
3. If the country's income inequality is widening in 
spite of the government's pledge for more equality in society, 
then what would cause such an occurrence? 
The first research question is addressed in Chapter II. 
The chapter will present an overview of economic development 
and income distribution and common patterns of income 
inequality observed in developing countries. These patterns 
should serve as a general guideline to indicate whether 
Thailand is following the same path as relatively more 
advanced countries. Kuznets' inverted U-shape hypothesis and 
the relative-inequality and absolute-poverty approaches used 
in measuring income distribution are the main focuses of the 
chapter. 
The following two chapters will address the second 
research question. Chapter III will briefly describe economic 
development in Thailand during the past three and a half 
decades. The main point of the chapter is the shift in the 
structure of production in which manufacturing has replaced 
agriculture as the major component of the national output. 
Statistics on income distribution expressed in both relative- 
inequality and absolute-poverty terms are presented in Chapter 
IV. The relative-inequality approach shows three comparisons: 
between the population in the agricultural and industrial 
sectors, between urban and rural areas and between the 
country's five regions (including the Bangkok Metropolitan 
Region). For the absolute-poverty approach, poverty levels are 
presented by regions. 
Factors affecting income distribution in Thailand are 
discussed in Chapter V. This chapter will focus on the effects 
of government policies on income distribution. The policies 
discussed in this chapter include the economic and social 
development plans, rural development programs, economic 
decentralization schemes and human resource development 
schemes. Since regional resource endowment has a relatively 
large impact on regional growth patterns and income 
structures, this chapter will also briefly discuss the effects 
of natural resource endowment on the country's income 
distribution. Key points found in the study are summarized in 
the closing chapter, Chapter VI. 

II. AN OVERVIEW OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND INCOME 
DISTRIBUTION 
A.  THE GAP BETWEEN RICH AND POOR 
There are generally two gaps separating rich and poor. 
Looking at the world as a whole, industrialized or developed 
countries have pulled themselves further ahead of developing 
countries. In 1950, the average annual per-capita of the 
industrialized countries was $3,841 (in 1980 U.S. dollars), 
while that of the low-income countries was $164, yielding an 
income ratio of 23:1 [Ref. 4]. In 1980, the average per-capita 
gross national product of industrialized countries soared to 
$10,200, whereas that of the poorest countries stood at $300, 
yielding an increasing ratio of 34:1 [Ref. 5]. By 1992, the 
ratio had escalated to 56:1 when the average per-capita GNP of 
industrialized countries sky-rocketed to $21,960, compared 
with $390 earned by the 40 poorest countries [Ref. 6]. 
The 1994 U.N. Human Development Report also reveals that the 
ratio between the incomes earned by the top 20 percent of the 
world population and the bottom 20 percent had grown from 30:1 
in 1960 to 61:1 in 1991. Furthermore, the richest 20 percent 
of the world population in 1991 shared 84.7 percent of total 
GNP and 84.2 percent of world trade. In contrast, the poorest 
20 percent claimed only 1.4 percent of the total GNP and 0.9 
percent of world trade.[Ref. 7] 
Besides the gap separating rich and poor countries, there 
is also a growing gap between the rich and poor citizens 
within many developing countries. Poor people who live in 
these countries have not only been falling further behind the 
world's rich, but further behind their relatively more 
affluent countrymen as well [Ref. 8]. Since there were few 
statistics on the distribution of income in developing 
countries when economic development was first studied, the 
problems  of  internal  inequality and poverty have been 
generally ignored. Development specialists assumed that 
everyone became better off as per-capita GNP rose. Therefore, 
development specialists overlooked the question of how the 
benefits of development were distributed. In 1954, Simon 
Kuznets delivered a seminal presidential address to the 
American Economic Association, which consequently encouraged 
economists to reconsider their stances on the internal gap 
between rich and poor people in developing countries. In his 
address, he tied income inequality not to economic development 
as a whole, but rather to each phase of development 
[Ref. 9]. 
B.  ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND INCOME DISTRIBUTION 
Whether looking at economic development as a whole or in 
stages, income distribution in a particular country is 
generally related to its economic status. But before 
discussing the details of Kuznets' address and his famous 
inverted U-shape hypothesis, it is helpful to distinguish 
between "economic growth" and "economic development." 
Economic growth refers to a rise in national or per- 
capita income and product, regardless of the means to that 
rise. A country is experiencing an economic growth if its 
production of goods and services rises. Economic development, 
however, does not simply imply a rise in per-capita income or 
national product. Development also requires fundamental 
changes in the structure of the country's economy. Among these 
structural changes, two are most important: the rising share 
of industry relative to agriculture in national product; and 
an increasing percentage of people who live in cities rather 
than the countryside. Furthermore, the major participants in 
the development process must be the people of the country. 
[Ref. 10] 
In Leading Issues in Economic Development, Gerald Meier 
describes economic development as an "upward movement of the 
entire social system."[Ref. 11] It means economic growth plus 
structural changes, including the improved performance of 
factors of production, improved techniques of production, and 
the development of institutions. He then, defines economic 
development as "the process whereby the real per capita income 
of a country increases over a long period of time -subject to 
the stipulations that the number of people below an "absolute 
poverty line" does not increase, and that the distribution of 
income does not become more unequal." [Ref. 12] By this 
definition, income distribution is closely related to economic 
development and the former actually becomes one of the 
requirements for the latter. 
As mentioned earlier, Kuznets' address to the American 
Economic Association sparked the study of the internal gap 
between the rich and poor in developing countries. Based on 
the fragments of data available at that time, his study 
indicated widening internal inequality in the early phases of 
economic development, particularly in old countries where the 
long-established pre-industrial economic and social 
institutions would be hard hit by the new industrial system. 
Narrowing internal inequality should then be expected in the 
later stages of development. In other words, the relationship 
between per-capita income and inequality in the distribution 
of income may follow an inverted U-shape pattern: as per- 
capita income rises, inequality may initially rise, reach a 
maximum, remain stable at an intermediate level of income, and 
then decline as income reaches levels similar to those in 
industrialized countries. Kuznets further claimed that the 
income structure in developing countries was somewhat more 
unequal than in the more advanced countries.[Ref. 13] 
Since Kuznets' proposition had limited empirical 
evidence, it led to more extensive studies and research. 
Montek Ahluwalia, in Inequality, Poverty and Development, used 
cross-country data from 60 some countries to reexamine the 
relationship between the distribution of income and the 
process of development [Ref. 14]. Although he was careful to 
indicate limitations and deficiencies of the data, Ahluwalia 
concluded that there is strong support for the proposition 
that relative inequality increases in the early stages of 
economic development and decreases in the later stages. The 
proposition also holds whether data are limited to only 
developing countries or expanded to include developed and 
socialist countries. More important, the cross-section results 
reveal that the degree of in equality does not depend on the 
rate of growth. Therefore, a slow growth rate could yield as 
high an inequality as a fast growth rate, given the stage of 
development achieved. 
Kuznets« inverted U-shape hypothesis also gets strong 
support from Erich Weede and Hoest Tiefembach. They used cross 
-national regression and correlation analysis to examine five 
separate explanations of internal income inequality: the level 
of economic development, socialism, military participation, 
democracy, and foreign investment dependency 
[Ref. 15]. They conclude that the level of economic 
development is the most convincing among the five 
explanations. In addition, their conclusions also support 
Ahluwalia's claim that at similar levels of economic 
development, fast-growing economies do not appear to generate 
a less equitable income distribution than slow-growing 
economies. And since "fast- and slow-growing economies are 
likely to experience a period of movement toward less 
egalitarian distributions, the faster growers are likely to 
reach the equalizing branch of the curve quicker than the slow 
growers."[Ref. 16] 
In another study, Irma Adelman and Cynthia Morris support 
Kuznets' hypothesis and go beyond it to conclude that the poor 
lose in absolute terms as well [Ref. 17]. Data indicate that 
inflation,   population  growth,   technological   change, 
commercialization of the traditional sector, and urbanization 
reduce the absolute average income of the poorest 4 0 to 60 
percent of the population in very low-income countries. 
Adelman and Morris suggest that it would take at least a 
generation for the poorest 60 percent of the population in an 
average country going through the earliest stage of economic 
development to recover their loss in absolute income. 
Another fundamental cause of the growing inequality 
during the early stages of development is the imbalance of 
growth between the industrial and agricultural sectors. Rapid 
growth in developing countries is normally associated with 
higher growth rates in the industrial sector than in the 
agricultural sector. Moreover, rural-to-urban migration, 
concentrated industrial development and an education system 
which encourages bright villagers to train in cities for urban 
jobs, move resources away from activities that help growth for 
the rural poor.[Ref. 18] 
Several studies reveal strong support for the inverted U- 
shape hypothesis and these studies hold up well in cross- 
section data, i.e., when estimates are made for a number of 
different countries at approximately the same time. However, 
they are less clearly present in time-series data, i.e., when 
comparable estimates are made at different times for 
particular countries. This is due to the limited amount of 
data available [Ref. 19]. Nevertheless, a number of 
policymakers and authorities agree that, in general, the 
distribution of income worsens in the early stages of 
development and improves as development proceeds 
[Ref. 20]. 
C.  MEASUREMENT OP INCOME DISTRIBUTION 
As previously mentioned, a major problem in the study of 
income distribution is the deficiencies and limitations of the 
available data. Different survey designs and executions, 
though conducted in the same country, could yield incomparable 
answers. Thus, in a broader context, the underlying problem is 
the reliability of data. Montek S. Ahluwalia, in Income 
Inequality: some dimensions of the problems, raises several 
issues concerning the measurement of income distribution. 
[Ref. 21] Besides limitations of the data, he points out that 
the income concept used in many surveys falls short of the 
comprehensive definition needed. The concept normally counts 
only money income. Hence, the true status of the rural 
population, particularly those in the agricultural sector, is 
somewhat understated. A portion of their earnings comes in 
non-money forms. In addition, most surveys are conducted over 
a relatively short period -usually a month or at most a year. 
Results from two surveys taken during harvesting and non- 
harvesting seasons in the agricultural sector would fluctuate 
tremendously. 
Even if income is comprehensively defined, surveys may be 
difficult to conduct in practice. How can one measure non- 
money income of farmers who help one another plant and harvest 
paddy fields? Furthermore, large numbers of rural poor in the 
agricultural sector grow farm produce for their own 
consumption. Similarly, the urban rich might not reveal their 
real incomes because of the progressive tax structure. The 
sample size and its representativeness also raise an accuracy 
problem in estimating the distribution of income for the 
population as a whole. These are some practical problems that 
increase the difficulty of obtaining accurate data. To 
minimize the discrepancies and inconsistencies associated with 
methods of measurement, most of Thailand's income distribution 
data will be drawn from either the National Statistical Office 
or the National Economic and Social Development Board. 
Another important aspect in studying the distribution of 
income is how to measure ineguality. In the relative- 
ineguality approach, the country's rich and poor are matched 
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against each other. The population of a particular country is 
grouped according to their incomes, starting from the lowest 
to the highest. This data is then used to calculated the 
Lorenz curve and Gini coefficient.[Ref. 22] 
50      75      100 
CUMULATIVE % OF RECIPIENTS 
Figure 2-1 Lorenz Curve 
Shown in Figure 2-1, the Lorenz curve represents the 
income share of any cumulative percentage of the population, 
ordered from the poorest to the richest as you move from left 
to right. The Gini coefficient is calculated from the Lorenz 
curve. It is defined as the ratio of the area between the 
Lorenz curve and the 45-degree line (A) to the total area (A 
+ B) . The coefficient varies from zero to one; zero represents 
perfect eguality and one represents complete inequality. 
An alternative approach used in measuring income 
distribution is the absolute-poverty approach. Instead of 
paring the poor against the rich, this approach directly 
examines a country's progress in reducing poverty among the 
poorest. Poverty lines, defined as the minimum annual income 
11 
a person needs to meet his or her basic consumption 
requirements, are set to determine the number of the poor as 
well  as to monitor progress toward poverty reduction. 
[Ref. 23] 
Policymakers may find that the relative-inequality and 
absolute-poverty approaches yield somewhat different answers. 
While the relative-inequality approach normally shows a 
widening gap between the rich and poor during the early stages 
of development, the absolute-poverty approach might indicate 
a great reduction in numbers of population living below the 
poverty lines. Which of the two approaches policymakers should 
focus on depends on the ultimate goal of development. If the 
goal is to narrow inequality, then policymakers should give 
greater weight to the relative-inequality approach. However, 
if the goal is to alleviate poverty, it seems logical to 
emphasize the absolute-poverty approach.[Ref. 24] 
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III.  THAILAND'S ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 
Thailand's economy has performed exceptionally well over 
the past several decades. In fact, Thailand is among the 
fastest growing and most successful developing countries in 
the world. Several factors have contributed to the country's 
fast growth. The dominant among these factors are: abundant 
natural resources; an enterprising and competitive private 
sector; and a pragmatic, cautious and, in some periods, 
conservative economic management. 
The country's principal comparative advantage has been 
the abundance and diversity of its natural resources. Fertile 
land and ideal growing conditions not only make Thailand an 
agriculturally self-sufficient country but also the sole net 
food exporter in Asia and one of the largest food exporters in 
the world [Ref. 25]. Rice has been the core of the 
agricultural sector. For well over a century it has been the 
country's highest valued export. To avoid having the entire 
agricultural sector relying on a single crop, farmers have 
been encouraged to grow sugar cane, cassava, maize, and 
several other cash crops as part of a diversification scheme. 
However, rice remains the largest foreign exchange earner 
among agricultural products, bringing in 36,214 million baht 
in 1992.[Ref. 26] 
The enterprising and competitive private sector has led 
the nation's growth and diversification into a new industrial 
era. In the early stage of Thailand's industrial development, 
the largest growing industries included food processing, 
largely using endogenous primary commodities as its main 
inputs, and the production of low-technology consumer goods. 
With the government providing infrastructural support and 
exerting relatively limited control over the private free 
enterprise system, the introduction of advanced technology has 
transformed the country into a fast rising manufacturer of 
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sophisticated products built to international standards and 
well accepted in the world market. [Ref. 27] 
A.  THE 1960S: IMPORT SUBSTITUTION-LED GROWTH 
Thailand's economic development had no clear direction 
until 1959, when it adopted a comprehensive industrialization 
system based on the private sector. To effectively implement 
the newly adopted strategy, the Board of Investment (BOI) was 
created as the principal government agency responsible for 
providing investment incentives to promote import-substituting 
industries. The government, in the meantime, redefined its 
role to providing basic infrastructure for the private sector. 
It also practiced conservative financial policies by keeping 
the deficit below two percent of gross domestic product and 
limiting annual monetary growth to 10-15 percent. 
[Ref. 28] In addition, the country's first economic 
development guideline, the National Economic and Social 
Development Plan was put in effect. It covered the period from 
1961 to 1965. 
Investment during the 1960s soared as a result of these 
policies. As shown in Table 3-1, Thailand's average annual 
growth rate of gross domestic product was 8.4 percent, 
compared with 5.8 percent for all middle-income, oil-importing 
countries. By sector, agriculture recorded a mild growth rate 
of 5.6 percent, while manufacturing and services reached more 
impressive growth rates of 11.4 percent and 9.1 percent, 
respectively. Agriculture was the primary driving force behind 
the fast growth. The availability of uncultivated land created 
opportunities for rapid growth in agriculture. Since 
manufacturing was largely limited to food processing and the 
production of low-technology consumer goods, agriculture also 
provided inputs for the manufacturing sector and generated 
demand for manufactured products. Domestic demand, protected 
by an import substitution policy, increased industrial output 
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rapidly.[Ref. 29] Although agriculture remained the backbone 
of the Thai economy, its share in gross domestic product fell 
sharply from 40 percent in .1960 to 26 percent in 1970, while 
the share of manufacturing rose from 13 percent to 16 percent 
during the same period (Table 3-2). 
Table 3-1  Average Annual Growth Rate of Gross Domestic 
Product (real percentage growth). 
Year     GDP Agriculture Industry Manufacturing Services 
1960-70 .   8.4     5.6       11.9       11.4        9.1 
1970-80     7.2     4.7       10.0       10.6        7.3 
1980-90     7.6     4.1        9.0        8.9        7.8 
Source: World Bank, World Development Report  1982,   1994. 
Table 3-2 Distribution of Gross Domestic Product (percentage) 
Agriculture  Industry  Manufacturing*  Services 
40 19 13 41 
26 25 16 49 
25 29 20 46 
17 30 20 53 
12 39 26 49 
Source: World Bank,' World Development Report,   various years. 
♦Manufacturing is a part of the industrial sector, but 
its share of GDP is separately shown because it is 
typically the most dynamic part of the sector. 
Toward the end of the 1960s, it became clear that import- 
substitution policies had put serious restraints on the 
country's economy. The small domestic market would soon limit 
the efficiency of import substitution. Furthermore, while 
manufacturing exports remained small and export diversifica- 








materials and capital goods by import-substituting industries 
had grown rapidly. This affected the trade balance and forced 
the government to review its trading policy.[Ref. 30] 
B.  THE 1970S: EXPORT-LED GROWTH 
From 1969 onward, trading policy shifted from import 
substitution to export promotion. Throughout the 1970s the 
Thai economy was hit hard by the oil crisis and global 
recession. Inflation in the country rose sharply after the oil 
shocks, and external debt and debt service increased 
significantly. In the meantime, policymakers made several 
pragmatic adjustments to curb macroeconomic and structural 
imbalances and to restore the past rates of economic growth. 
[Ref. 31] 
Thailand was able to maintain relatively high economic 
growth throughout the decade. Although it could not sustain 
the 1960s' GDP growth rate of 8.4 percent a year, its 1970s' 
7.2 percent GDP growth rate was still higher than the 5.6- 
percent average for the middle-income, oil-importing 
countries. As in the 1960s, manufacturing and services 
increased their contributions to gross domestic product 
growing at 10.6 percent and 7.3 percent, respectively, while 
agriculture grew at a lower rate of 4.7 percent. The main 
driving force contributing to these results, however, was an 
acceleration in the growth of exports. Exports, rose at an 
average of 14 percent a year in volume. Exports of tapioca, 
sugar and canned pineapple recorded substantial increases 
among processed primary products, whereas exports of textiles 
and clothing, electronics, and jewelry rose remarkably among 
manufactured goods.[Ref. 32] 
Toward the end of the 1970s, various factors indicated a 
slower growth rate for Thailand's exports, particularly in the 
agricultural sector. Among these factors, the near exhaustion 
of uncultivated land began to constrain the expansion of 
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agricultural exports [Ref. 33]. Thus, the country's dominant 
influence on the pattern of development over the past century, 
the abundance of land, began to fade. However, the share of 
agriculture in GDP (Table 3-2) had been relatively stable 
throughout the decade, decreasing minimally from 26 to 25 
percent. Meanwhile, the share of manufacturing in GDP 
continued to rise from 16 to 2 0 percent during the same 
period. 
C.  THE 1980S: A BUST-AND-BOOM DECADE 
Oil shocks continued to stir the global economy during 
the first half of the 1980s. Like many other developing 
countries, Thailand paid a heavy toll for the global recession 
and downturn in commodity prices. Although the country's 
annual GDP growth rate remained higher than the average for 
middle-income countries, macroeconomic and structural 
imbalances, such as decreasing saving and investment rates, 
increasing budget deficits and higher debt and debt-servicing 
obligations, increased economic tensions. Nonetheless, with 
prompt and pragmatic policy responses, the imbalances were 
quickly readjusted and the country's economy bounced back even 
more strongly during the second half of the decade [Ref. 34]. 
During this period, Thailand emerged with the potential of 
becoming the fifth Asian tiger and joining the newly 
industrialized countries (NICs) along with South Korea, 
Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore. 
Thailand experienced an economic boom from 1987 to 1990. 
During this period, real GDP rose by an average of over 11 
percent per year, impressively high in absolute terms and in 
comparison with other dynamic countries in the region (Table 
3-3) . A tradition of cautious financial policies in the public 
sector, combined with both a commitment to an outward- 
oriented, market based economic system and a development 
strategy focused on the private sector, led to a surge in 
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private investment, particularly in the export-oriented 
manufacturing sector. These three factors were the main 
contributors to success. 
Table 3-3  Real GDP Growth Rate (annual percentage change) 
Year Thailand Malavsia Indonesia Ph.pines Sinaapore S. Korea 
1985 3.5 -1.0 2.5 -4.4 -1.6 6.9 
1986 4.9 1.2 5.9 3.4 1.8 12.4 
1987 9.5 5.4 4.8 4.8 9.4 12.0 
1988 13.2 8.9 5.8 6.3 11.1 11.5 
1989 12.0 8.8 7.5 6.1 9.2 6.2 
1990 10.0 10.0 7.1 2.4 8.4 9.2 
1991 8.2 9.0 6.6 -1.0 6.7 8.4 
1992 7.5 8.7 6.0 -0.3 5.0 4.7 
1993 7.8 - - 3.1 - 6.0 
Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook May 1993. 
One of the most noticeable achievements during the boom 
period was the sharp increase in exports, particularly in the 
manufacturing sector. Total exports of goods and services in 
1990 accounted for 745.3 billion baht, representing a full 
three-fold increase from 245.3 billion baht in 1985. By 1992, 
the total export value had reached one thousand-billion baht 
[Ref. 35]. The increasing competitiveness of Thai exports 
resulted in part from a devaluation of the baht in late 1984. 
Thailand also eliminated most export taxes and other burdens 
on exports.[Ref. 36] 
As shown in Table 3-4, manufacturing represented only 6.1 
percent of total exports in 1970. Its share climbed to 32.3 
percent by 1980 and sky-rocketed to 80.0 percent by 1990. The 
share of agriculture to total exports, on the other hand, had 
taken a nose-drive from 71.5 percent to 18.0 percent during 
the same period. As presented in Table 3-2, the weight of 
manufacturing in GDP had more than doubled that of agriculture 
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by the end of the 198 0s. 
Table 3-4 Thailand's Structure of Exports (percentage of 
total) 
Year Agriculture Manufacturing Mining   Others 
1970 71.5         6.1         13.9       8.5 
1980 51.2        32.3         11.6       4.9 
1990 18.0        80.0          -         2.0 
Source: Bank of Thailand, Thai Economy in  1994. 
Thailand's manufacturing output and exports have not only 
increased in volume, but have become increasingly diversified 
as well. Traditionally, textiles, food and beverages, and 
transport equipment played important roles in exports. 
However, non-traditional exports, including computer parts, 
consumer electronics, travel goods and toys, accounted for 
more than half of the export growth during the boom years. 
This trend, along with a breakneck growth in real estate 
prices and property development, boosted construction and 
services, especially in the financial sector. Tourism also 
expanded rapidly.[Ref. 37] 
For over a century, rice had been the largest foreign 
exchange earner. But as manufacturing output and exports have 
continued out-growing agricultural products, rice eventually 
lost its dominance. Although it is still the most important 
crop in the agricultural sector, Table 3-5 clearly illustrates 
that rice accounts for only 3.4 percent of total exports. This 
ranks fifth among top export earners in 1992. The top two 
export earners, tourism and textiles, each brought in over 
three times the foreign exchange of rice. Surprisingly, 
computers and parts, something with which the country was 
unfamiliar during the 1960s, was a distant third, but still 
accounted for almost twice the export revenue of rice. 
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Table 3-5  Top Five Export Earners in 1992 
Percentage 






Travel Receipts (Tourism) 
Textile Products 
Computers and Parts 
Precious Stone and Jewelry 
Rice 
Source: Bank of Thailand, 1994. 
After the 1987-1990 period of high growth exceeding 11 
percent annually, the Thai economy has grown at a more 
moderate rate of 7-8 percent a year. Thailand Development 
Research Institute estimates the country's growth rate in 1995 
will be around 9 percent. With this growth rate, agriculture 
is expected to rise by only 2.1 percent; manufacturing and 
services are expected to grow at much higher rates of 12.0 
percent and 7.9 percent, respectively.[Ref. 38] 
There is no doubt that the economic performance has 
raised the country's quality of life to a new standard. Prior 
to the introduction of the first economic development plan in 
1961, the nominal per-capita annual income was only 2,056 baht 
(less than $100). In 1991, at the end of the sixth plan, per- 
capita annual income rose to 41,000 baht ($1,640), recording 
nearly a 20-fold increase from 1961. A target of 71,000 baht 
($2,850) is set for the end of the seventh plan (1992-1996). 
With per-capita income of 58,903 baht at the end of 1994, the 
new target seems to be well within reach.[Ref. 39] 
Although Thailand has experienced high economic growth 
and shown a strong potential for becoming one of the Asian 
NICs, the continuing imbalance of growth among different 
sectors has created inequalities in Thai society. While growth 
in recent years has increasingly come from industry and 
services, which combined account for nearly 90 percent of GDP, 
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the majority of the population still earn their living from 
agriculture. This majority shares only 12 percent of the 
nation's GDP. Policymakers often claim credit for managing the 
country's economy. At the same time, the question of who 
actually benefits from the development has increasingly been 
raised by those who seem to be left behind. 
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IV.  THE IMBALANCE OF GROWTH 
Thailand has been experiencing a change in the structure 
of production in which manufacturing has replaced agriculture 
as the major component of the national output. This is a 
common pattern observed in developing countries during 
economic development. Although the rise of the manufacturing 
share in GDP relative to agriculture is a common pattern, 
statistics show that countries following this pattern do not 
share the same relative rates of change. The question of the 
proper relationship between agricultural and industrial 
development remains a puzzle among planners and policymakers 
around the world.[Ref. 40] Thai authorities have attempted to 
maintain respectable growth rates in all sectors. However, 
agriculture seems to be falling behind. 
A.  AGRICULTURE AND INDUSTRY 
Comparing labor force structure and sectoral value-added 
provides one of the most amazing statistics of the Thai 
economy. According to labor force surveys, the size of the 
country's agricultural sector has been declining, but still 
remains at relatively high levels. In 1960, 84 percent of 
total labor force was engaged in agricultural work and 
produced approximately 40 percent of GDP. Two decades later, 
in 1980, 76 percent of the labor force was still engaged in 
the agriculture sector, but they produced only 25 percent of 
GDP. By 1990, the labor force in agriculture had fallen to 60 
percent; its value-added in GDP had dropped to 12 percent 
[Ref. 41]. On the other hand, manufacturing only accounted for 
10 percent of the total labor force in 1990, but accounted for 
26 percent of GDP. This means that in 1990 manufacturing labor 
was 13 times more productive than agricultural labor. It also 
implies that labor productivity in the agricultural sector is 
relatively low and provides a basis for expecting Thailand to 
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for expecting Thailand to have great inequality between urban 
and rural incomes [Ref. 42]. 
According to income surveys conducted by the Office of 
Agriculture for Economy (Table 4-1), the average annual per- 
capita income in the agricultural sector rose from 2,000 baht 
in 1981 to 2,544 baht in 1990, representing an increase of 27 
percent. During the same period, the average annual per-capita 
income in the non-agricultural sector rose from 15,310 baht to 
25,693 baht, representing an increasing of„nearly 70 percent. 
As a result, the income gap between these two sectors widened 
from 13,310 baht to 23,149 baht. In relative terms, the income 
ratio increased from 7.7:1 to 10.1:1 in favor of the non- 
agricultural sector. 
Table 4-1 Comparison of Income per Capita in Agricultural and 
Non-Agricultural Sector (at 1972 constant baht) 
1981    1986    1988    1990 
Earning in agricultural 
sector (million baht)        65,093 78,775 86,629 90,711 
-Percentage of total earning 20.4 19.0 16.9 14.0 
-Per-capita income          2,000 2,299 2,476 2,544 
Earning in non-agricultural 
sector (million baht)       253,346 334,714 425,838 540,899 
-Percentage of total earning 79.6 80.9 83.1 85.6 
-Per-capita income         15,310 17,274 21,039 25,693 
Ratio: non-agri./agri.      7.7:1  7.5:1  8.5:1  10.1:1 
Source: Office of Agriculture for Economy, Thailand. 
[Ref. 43] 
It is worth noting that there are some discrepancies in 
determining the sectoral labor force in Thailand. Because of 
highly seasonal  fluctuations  in agricultural work,  the 
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definitions and methods of measuring the labor force tend to 
overstate the relative size of agricultural employment. The 
Labor Ministry estimates that about one million people flock 
to Bangkok and other urban areas annually to look for jobs 
during the dry season, lasting from November to May [Ref. 44]. 
Since sectoral measurement of labor force requires these 
individuals to be assigned to one sector or another, even 
though they shift between sectors over the time of the year, 
the share of employment in agriculture appears to be higher 
than the actual amount. However, the one-million urban 
migrants are a small share of the nation's total labor force 
of over 30 million. Shifting all migrant workers to 
manufacturing still leaves agriculture with a share of the 
total labor force that exceeds its share of GDP. 
B.  URBAN AND RURAL AREAS 
The extraordinary difference in productivity between 
agriculture and industry (or manufacturing) is a good 
indication that there is a strong difference in earned income 
between urban and rural areas. In fact, socio-economic surveys 
conducted by the National Statistical Office between 1981 and 
1992 confirm this expectation.[Ref. 45] 
Between 1981 and 1992, household income increased at an 
average rate of 8.2 percent a year, boosting the average 
annual per-capita household income from 9,008 baht to 21,729 
baht (Table 4-2). During this period, income in rural areas 
rose from 6,991 baht to 13,73 3 baht; this compares with an 
increase from 17,415 baht to 4 0,04 6 baht for those living in 
urban areas (excluding the Bangkok Metropolitan Region). In 
relative terms, the income ratio in urban and rural areas 
widened from 2.5:1 to 2.9:1. However, this income gap actually 
narrowed between 1986 and 1990. Thus, the economic boom alone 
did not give a greater comparative gain to the urbanites than 
to their fellow countrymen living in rural areas. 
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Table 4-2  Household Income in Bangkok Metropolitan Region, 
Urban Areas and Rural Areas (at current price) 
1981    1986    1988    1990    1992 
Average Annual per Capita 
Household Income (baht)  9,008 10,133 12,318 16,463 21,729 
- BMR* 17,063  21,944  27,007  39,000  56,298 
- Urban Areas**      17,415 21,013 21,617 27,685 40,046 
- Rural Areas 6,991 7,144 8,837 11,152 13,733 
Ratio: BMR/Rural 2.4:1 3.1:1 3.1:1 3.5:1 4.1:1 
Ratio: Urban/Rural 2.5:1 2.9:1 2.5:1 2.5:1 2.9:1 
Source: National Statistical Office.[Ref. 46] 
* Bangkok Metropolitan Region includes Bangkok and its 
three surrounding provinces of Samut Prakarn, 
Nontha Buri, and Pratum Thani. 
** Excluding BMR. 
Between 1975 and 1985, the average income in the Bangkok 
Metropolitan Region (BMR) increased faster than any other 
region [Ref. 47]. Table 4-2 shows that BMR residents have 
received the largest share of benefits from the country's 
economic development. In 1981, an average BMR resident 
actually earned less than an average urbanite and 2.4 times 
the income of a rural resident. In 1986, a BMR resident 
brought home about the same earnings as an urban resident, but 
3.1 times the rural resident. Then, BMR residents' incomes 
began to rise faster than those in urban and rural areas 
during the boom years and continued to rise afterward. By 
1992, a BMR resident earned 1.4 times as much as an urban 
resident and 4.1 times the residents living in rural areas. 
In general, Table 4-2 implies that with Thailand's 
economic development, people in urban areas, particularly in 
BMR, are much better off than those in rural areas. Rural 
residents have been falling further behind the rest of the 
country. Since the percentage of urban residents in Thailand 
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is very low, most benefits from development accrue to a small 
portion of the population. From 1960 to 1980, the share of 
urbanites to total population has increased minimally from 13 
to 14 percent. It was only after 1980 that urbanization began 
to accelerate, reaching 18 percent by 1985 and 23 percent by 
1990. The percentage of the urban population still stood at 23 
in 1992, an unusually low figure compared with the 62 percent 
average for all middle-income countries. In addition, nearly 
70 percent of the Thai urbanites live in BMR [Ref. 48]. Thus, 
most development benefits accrue to a specialized group of 
people; specifically, to those who live in the Bangkok 
Metropolitan Region. 
Table 4-3 Regional Distribution of Household Income (Current 
Bant) 
1981     1986     1988    1990     1992 
Average Annual per-Capita 
Household Income   9,008 10,133 12,318 16,463 21,729 
- BMR 17,063 21,944 27,007 39,080 56,298 
- Central        10,288 11,446 12,985 17,481 21,808 
Urban Central(15,758) (20,369) (20,483) (28,891) (40,285) 
Rural Central (9,519)  (9,837) (11,400) (15,433) (18,409) 
- South 8,880   10,499   11,587   14,054   18,682 
Urban South  (18,307) (22,070) (23,170) (26,220) (40,951) 
Rural South   (7,421)  (8,403)  (9,176) (12,195) (15,300) 
- North 8,447    9,557   11,047   14,920   17,043 
Urban North  (19,086) (22,594) (24,709) (33,503) (43,221) 
Rural North   (7,346)  (8,363)  (9,915) (12,736) (13,982) 
-Northeast       5,911    6,257    8,179    9,411 12,628 
Urban NE     (15,923) (20,385) (18,120) (23,012) (36,803) 
Rural NE      (5,386)  (5,196)  (7,130)  (8,324) (11,240) 
Source: National Statistical Office.[Ref. 49] 
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Table 4-4   Regional Distribution of Household Income (in 
relative terras) 
1981    1986    1988    1990    1992 
Average Annual per-Capita 
Household Income  9,008  10,133 12,318 16,463 21,729 
Base Ratio         1.00    1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
- BMR              1.89    2.17 2.19 2.24 2.59 
- Central        1.14   1.13 1.05 1.06 1.00 
Urban Central (1.75)  (2.01) (1.66) (1.75) (1.85) 
Rural Central (1.06)  (0.97) (0.94) (0.94) (0.85) 
1.03 0.94    0.83 0.86 
(2.18) (1.88) (1.59) (1.88) 
(0.83) (0.74) (0.74) (0.71) 
0.94 0.90    0.91 0.78 
(2.23) (2.01) (2.04) (1.99) 
(0.83) (0.80) (0.77) (0.64) 
0.62 0.66    0.58 0.58 
(2.01) (1.47) (1.40) (1.69) 
(0.51) (0.58) (0.51) (0.52) 
Source: adapted from Table 4-3. 
The regional distribution of income and production 
highlights another important aspect of income disparity in 
Thailand. Tables 4-3 and 4-4 reaffirm that residents of the 
Bangkok Metropolitan Region have claimed most of the nation's 
economic prosperity. In 1992, they earned more than two and a 
half times the second highest average income, found in the 
central region. In fact, between 1981 and 1992, BMR was the 
only region that gained relative to the national average 
household income; the north experienced the worst decline. 
In 1992, urban residents in the north earned the highest 
income among all urban and rural residents, excluding BMR. The 
average income in the north, however, was lower than the 
average incomes in the central and south. This resulted 
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- South . 0.99 
Urban South (2.03) 
Rural South (0.82) 
- North 0.94 
Urban North (2.12) 
Rural North (0.82) 
- Northeast 0.66 
Urban NE (1-77) 
Rural NE (0.60) 
because incomes in the rural north were lower than those in 
the rural central and rural south. Data from other years also 
show results similar to 1992. Thus, incomes of the rural 
residents outweigh incomes of the urbanites and play a 
significant role in determining average regional incomes. 
The tables also point out that the northeast, housing 
one-third of the country's population, is the poorest region, 
though it had the smallest decline in relative household 
income. In 1992, an average Northeasterner earned 
approximately one-half of the national average household 
income and one-fifth of an average Bangkokian. 
Table 4-5  Regional Share of Gross Domestic Product and 
Regional Population 
Share of GDP Pooulation per-Capita 
1981 1989 1989 Contribution 
Total (percent; 100 100 100 1.00 
Bangkok* 42.6 48.0 9.6 5.00 
Central** 19.2 18.7 22.7 0.82 
South 10.0 9.0 12.8 0.70 
North 13.5 11.4 20.2 0.56 
Northeast 14.7 12.9 34.7 0.37 
Source: NESDB and Bank of Thailand (partly adapted) 
* Bangkok only.  ** Excluding Bangkok 
In 1989, Bangkok alone accounted for 48 percent of the 
country's gross domestic product (Table 4-5). To claim this 
share, three-fourths of manufacturing value-added and two- 
thirds of banking and trade value-added were generated within 
the capital's boundary [Ref. 50]. As a result, its per-capita 
contribution to GDP was six times that of the central region, 
seven times the south, nine times the north and 13 times the 
northeast. Interestingly, the difference in regional 
contribution to GDP in Table 4-5 is consistent with the 
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difference in regional household income in Tables 4-3 and 4-4. 
Bangkok or BMR is at the top, followed by the central, south, 
north, and northeast regions. 
C.  DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME 
The agriculture-industry and urban-rural comparisons in 
the previous sections have shown that people who live in BMR 
get the largest benefit from development; rural residents in 
the northeast receive the smallest benefit. This section will 
compare the population when grouped according to income level 
(as in the Lorenz curve). 
The distribution of income presented in Table 4-6 
reaffirms that the more affluent groups of population have 
increasingly claimed larger shares of income. Between 1986 and 
1992, the share of income for the richest 10 percent of the 
Thai citizens increased from 21.8 percent to 3 5.8 percent. The 
share for the richest 20 percent also increased from 33.6 
percent to 51.9 percent. This means that more than one-half of 
total household income accrued to the top 20 percent of the 
population. On the other hand, the shares of income for all 
poorest groups declined during the same period. In 1992, the 
poorest 10- and 20-percent groups earned only 2.2 and 5.4 
percent of total income, both showing a drop of 0.6 percent 
from the 1986 levels. 
Micheal Lipton, in Urban Bias and Inequality, suggests 
that income in poor countries is usually more equally 
distributed within the rural sector than the urban sector. 
[Ref. 51] His statement appears to hold well for Thailand too. 
From Table 4-6, the poorest groups in the rural areas 
generally have higher shares of income than those in the urban 
areas, and vise versa for the richest groups. Of course, a 
poor urbanite actually earns a lot more than a poor rural 
resident because the average income in urban areas is roughly 
three times higher than that in rural areas (Table 4-2). 
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Table 4-6 Sectoral Distribution of Income (percentage share) 
Lowest Lowest Lowest Lowest Highest Highest 
Year 10% 20% 40% 60% 20% 10% 
Thailand 
1986 2.8 6.0 15.8 29.3 33.6 21.8 
1988 3.2 8.1 20.3 35.7 41.3 26.0 
1990 2.4 5.9 15.1 28.4 50.5 34.4 
1992 2.2 5.4 14.3 27.4 51.9 35.8 
BMR 
1986 3.1 7.8 20.6 37.9 40.3 26.7 
1988 3.4 8.6 21.3 37.9 40.5 25.7 
1990 2.8 7.2 19.5 34.9 45.6 30.5 
Urban Areas 
1981 2.9 7.7 21.1 35.8 43.6 29.8 
1986 3.8 6.6 18.6 35.1 42.3 27.5 
1988 3.1 7.8 20.0 36.8 39.6 23.3 
1990 2.5 6.7 18.0 33.7 46.6 31.8 
1992 2.3 6.5 17.8 33.1 45.4 30.6 
Rural Areas 
1981 3.6 8.7 22.1 38.8 35.8 25.7 
1986 3.4 8.2 20.6 36.9 40.9 26.0 
1988 3.3 8.0 19.9 36.0 42.2 27.0 
1990 3.0 7.3 18.6 33.3 45.6 30.6 
1992 3.1 7.5 19.2 34.5 43.9 28.4 
Sources: National Statistical Office.[Ref. 52] 
Among the four regions, the northeast shows the greatest 
increase in equality (Tabl e 4-7). Between 1986 and 1992, the 
shares of income for the poorest 10 to 60 percent of the 
northeastern population rose, whereas the shares of income for 
its richest 10 and 20 percent declined. The i  poorest 60 -percent 
group in 1992 shared 3 2.8 percent of the northeast's income, 
making a gain of 3 .6 percent since the 1986. In the meantime, 
the share >.   of income for the richest 20-percent group dropped 
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from 51.1 percent in 1986 to 47.5 percent in 1992. In addition, 
the northeast's poorest 10- and 20-percent groups in 1992 earned 
the highest shares of income among their comparable groups in 
other regions. 
Table 4-7  Regional Distribution of Income (percentage share) 
Lowest Lowest Lowest Lowest Highest Highest 
10% 20% 40% 60% 20% 10% Year 
Central 
1986 2.8 6.8 17.4 • 32.3 45.6 
30.0 
1988 2.9 7.5 19.4 36.1 41.1 
24.9 
1990 2.3 6.2 16.5 31.7 46.9 
33.0 
1992 2.8 7.0 18.4 34.4 43.0 
28.8 
South 
1986 2.6 6.5 17.4 32.9 45.8 
29.8 
1988 3.4 8.2 20.5 37.5 41.4 
25.3 
1990 2.9 7.0 17.9 33.1 45.7 
30.8 
1992 2.4 6.4 17.2 32.9 46.0 
29.3 
North 
1986 2.4 6.1 16.0 29.8 47.4 
29.6 
1988 3.0 7.5 19.1 34.8 43.3 
26.8 
1990 2.6 6.3 16.9 30.8 48.2 
33.1 
1992 2.8 6.7 17.3 31.4 47.7 
32.2 
Northeast 
1986 2.7 6.2 16.0 29.2 51.1 
34.6 
1988 3.3 8.0 20.2 35.9 
41.4 27.2 
1990 3.4 8.2 20.5 35.8 44.2 
29.1 
1992 3.1 7.5 18.3 32.8 
47.5 33.0 
Source: National Statistical Office.[Ref. 53] 
interestingly, Table 4-7 gives a mixed result for the 
Northern region. The shares of income for the poorest 10- to 60- 
percent groups as well as the richest 10- and 20-percent groups 
all increased between 1986 and 1992. Only people in the fourth 
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quintile (the 60-80-percent group) lost their share of income. 
The central region also shows some increase in equality, though 
to a smaller degree than the northeast. In the south, the 
distribution seems to stay constant over time. The income shares 
for the southern population in 1986 and 1992 are almost 
identical. Nevertheless, the degree of inequality in all four 
regions is not significantly different from one region to 
another. 
It is difficult to understand how equally, or unequally, 
income is distributed by simply looking at the numbers presented 
in Tables 4-6 and 4-7. For a better understanding, data from the 
tables have been converted into graphs and illustrated in 
Figures 4-1 to 4-8. Notice that the equality of income among 
people in urban and rural areas and in all four regions 
increased somewhat in 1988, then declined afterward. The 
country's income equality, however, did not show any improvement 
in 1988. In fact, between 1986 and 1992 it moved toward greater 
inequality, largely because of the income pattern in BMR. Since 
the income level in BMR is much higher than in urban and rural 
areas, any improvement in equality occurring outside BMR is off- 
set by BMR's income pattern. And as long as the income 
inequality in BMR continues to increase, the inequality for the 













1986 1988 1990 1992 















1986 1988 1990 
Lowest 2GK Second Quirttile V//A Third Quintile IA/N Rairlh Quitiile 
l\\i Higherf 20JC 








1985 19S3 1990 1992 












Lowest 2CÄ Second Quintile K%4 Third Quintile 
|\\J Higherf 20JC 










1905 19SB 1390 1992 








Lowest 20K Second Quintile V/M Third Quintite 
|\M Highed 20JC 










1986 1933 1990 1992 











Svand Quintile k/>fl Third Quintile 
l\\J Highes* 20* 
1992 
Fourth Quintile 
Figure 4-8 Income Distribution in the Northeastern Region 
37 
D.  POVERTY REDUCTION 
The results from the comparisons in sections A, B and C 
show widening gaps between the country's rich and poor. The 
urban population, particularly in BMR, has received the largest 
share of the fruits of development, whereas the rural 
population, particularly in the northeast, has fallen further 
behind. 
Rather than matching the urban rich against rural poor, an 
alternative approach, the absolute-poverty approach, measures 
poverty reduction directly. In this approach, poverty lines are 
drawn to determine the portion of the population living in 
poverty and monitors progress toward poverty reduction. The 
poverty line is defined as the minimum annual per-capita income 
that a family needs to satisfy their basic consumption 
requirements. For example, the 1992 poverty lines in Thailand 
stood at 7,870 baht in urban areas and 5,258 baht in rural areas 
[Ref. 54]. 
Several poverty surveys have been conducted in Thailand by 
different academic groups and organizations since the early 
1960s. Results from the surveys vary from one study to another, 
depending on the survey designs. However, they all show similar 
poverty characteristics for Thailand. Poverty is less widespread 
in urban areas than in rural areas and is most prevalent in the 
northeast. Most important of all, a substantial reduction in 
poverty has been observed throughout the country during the last 
three and a half decades. In 1962, as many as 57 percent of the 
Thai citizens, or 16 million out of the total population of 28 
million, lived below the poverty line. Poverty in urban areas 
stood at 30 percent, compared with 61 and 74 percent in rural 
areas and the northeast, respectively. By 1981, the poverty 
percentage had been reduced to 23 percent. In absolute terms, 
the number of people living in poverty had fallen to 11 million 
(out of the total population of 47.7 million). Poverty levels in 
38 
the urban, rural and the northeast areas fell to 16, 26, and 36 
percent, respectively [Ref. 55]. 
The portion of population living under the poverty line 
increased to about 30 percent in the first half of the 1980s, 
largely due to declining crop prices. But the economic boom in 
the second half of the decade reversed this trend. By 1988, the 
portion of those under the poverty line had returned to its 1981 
level.[Ref. 56] 
Table 4-8  Percentage of Population Living Below the Poverty 
Line 
1986 1988 1990 
Poverty Line (baht) : Urban 5,834 6,324 7,148 
Rural 3,823 4,141 4,569 
Thailand (percent) 26.3 21.2 18.0 
- BMR 5.2 5.4 4.0 
- Central 16.8 15.2 12.7 
- North 24.1 18.9 15.6 
- South 22.5 20.0 18.0 
- Northeast 41.3 32.2 27.7 
Source: NESDB.[Ref. 57] 
Results from recent surveys conducted by the National 
Economic and Social- Development Board are shown in Table 4-8. 
Poverty in all regions has continuously declined. In 1990, 
poverty for the whole country stood at 18 percent; 9.8 million 
people out of the total population of 54.5 million lived in 
poverty. As one may expect, BMR has the lowest poverty level, 
while the northeast has the highest. However, the greatest 
reduction in poverty has been in the northeast. The poverty 
level in the northeast dropped from 74 percent in 1962 to 41 
percent in 1986 and 28 percent in 1990. The reasons behind this 
impressive improvement will be discussed in the next chapter. 
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The relative-inequality and absolute-poverty approaches 
give a contrasting view about distribution of income during the 
course of Thailand's economic development. Results from the 
relative-inequality approach might suggest economic development 
has hurt lower income groups and poorer regions. On the other 
hand, results from the absolute-poverty approach indicate just 
the opposite. The next chapter will look into probable causes 
and factors affecting the country's income distribution. 
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V.  CAUSES OF INCOME DIFFERENCES 
Economic development has raised the standard of living in 
Thailand and also helped millions of Thais out of poverty 
status. However, benefits from development have accrued 
disproportionately to a small group of the population, causing 
a widening income gap between the urban rich and rural poor. 
Several factors contribute to these dual results. Regional 
differentiation in natural resource endowment and government 
policies on economic and social development are two prominent 
factors. 
This chapter will mainly focus on the effects of government 
policies on the distribution of income. However, to understand 
the impact that geographical differentiation has on regional 
growth patterns, the following section will briefly discuss 
natural resource endowment. 
A.  REGIONAL RESOURCE ENDOWMENT 
Although Thailand is not a big country, its four regions 
present very distinctive geographical differentiation. The 
central plain has been long known as the country's rice bowl. 
Its rich and fertile soil provides superior conditions for rice 
cultivation. In addition, the relatively flat landscape and 
ample water from rivers originating in the mountainous north 
make it possible to irrigate most of the central arable land. As 
a result, this region has the highest percentage of irrigated 
cultivated area. Furthermore, it is closer to major cities and 
exporting markets than other regions. 
The tropical warm weather and a long rainy season make the 
narrow southern peninsula a perfect place for rubber 
cultivation. The region is the world's second largest source of 
natural rubber after Malaysia. Fishery is another major source 
of revenue in the region. The Thai fishing fleet is well 
recognized both at home ports and in international waters. 
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Besides rubber and fisheries, the peninsula is rich with tin 
deposits. Mining has been the region's back bone industry. As 
previously shown in Table 3-5, the number one export earner in 
1992 was tourism. This fast growing industry owes its success to 
beautiful beaches in the south. They have become major tourist 
attractions, drawing in millions of tourists to the region every 
year. 
The northern region has two distinctive features. The upper 
part of the region is mountainous, supplying several of the 
country's main rivers. The flatter lower part slopes toward the 
central plain. While rice is the main cash crop in the lower 
area, a cooler climate gives the upper area an advantage in 
growing other cash crops, fruits and vegetable. Similar to the 
south, tourism has become increasingly important to the region. 
The charming northern culture and tradition, combined with the 
cool climate and mountainous terrain contribute to this growing 
industry. 
The semi-arid northeast is separated from the central plain 
by the Korat Plateau. It stands at an average of 300 meters 
above the sea level and houses one-third of Thailand's popula- 
tion. The region is characterized by poor, "sandy," soil condi- 
tions and irregular rainfall. Sandy soil can not hold water 
well, causing serious water shortages even for daily personal 
uses during the dry season. It also responds poorly to 
fertilizer and gives low yields per acre. In addition to sandy 
soil, a sizable part of the region -approximately 16 percent- 
has very shallow topsoil. Bed rock and gravel in this area are 
found only 0.5 meters (less than two feet) from the surface. 
Another alarming problem concerning the soil conditions in the 
northeast is the spread of salty soil. Large deposits of salt 
rocks are scattered throughout the region. Since the sandy top 
soil doesn't hold water well, lowland floods normally occur 
after heavy rainfalls. These floods wash off large amounts of 
salt and leave it on the surface. This makes the area virtually 
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useless for cultivation.[Ref. 58] 
In addition to poor soil conditions, the northeast has the 
lowest rainfall among the four regions. Long summer droughts are 
common. Because of the water shortages and limitations on 
topographic and water-flow characteristics, only about 15 
percent of the arable land can be irrigated. As a result, only 
seven percent of the region's cultivated areas were irrigated in 
1987.[Ref. 59] 
The difference in resource endowment is reflected by 
cropping patterns. In the central plain, 93 percent of the 
irrigated area is double cropped in rice. In contrast, double 
cropping in rice is a rare practice in the north and northeast. 
While 78 percent of the irrigated area in the north grows other 
crops during the dry season, 54 percent of its rainfed area is 
left unseeded. Since water is usually inadequate in the 
northeast, as much as 40 percent of the region's irrigated area 
and 75 percent of the rainfed area are uncultivated during the 
dry season.[Ref. 60] 
In general, the natural resource endowment has set initial 
conditions for growth patterns and income structures in the four 
regions, especially for people in the agricultural sector. 
Differences in endowments give a competitive advantage to some 
regions over others, and vise versa. The remainder of this 
chapter will focus on the government's efforts to counter- 
balance these preset conditions. 
B.  ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT PLANS 
One public policy affecting income distribution in Thailand 
is the National Economic and Social Development Plan. Although 
the government has a limited role in .the country's economic 
development, the plan is still considered the most important 
economic document. It sets up overall economic goals, guidelines 
and directions for both the public and private sectors. 
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1.  An Overview of Economic and Social Development Plans 
Over the last 3 5 years, the Royal Thai Government has 
implemented seven National Economic and Social Development 
Plans. The Office of the National Economic and Social 
Development Board (NESDB), serving under the Office of the Prime 
Minister, prepares, recommends and revises the plans. From the 
first of the series to the latest, the plans have increasingly 
reflected the importance of industrial development in Thailand's 
overall economic development. Successive governments have 
consistently held two basic policies since the first plan. 
First, the private sector should be the leading force in 
bringing about the development; the government should take a 
supporting role in assisting and providing the private sector 
infrastructure, technological resources and human development. 
Second, the government should guarantee the private sector 
against   competition   from   new   state   enterprises. 
[Ref. 61] 
The first plan, called "the National Economic Development 
Plan," covered a six-year period from 1961 to 1966. Its primary 
objective was to raise the country's standard of living. The 
plan emphasized investments in infrastructure, particularly 
those involving hydro-electric power, transportation networks 
and irrigation systems [Ref. 62]. In addition, it asserted the 
importance of an equitable income distribution, stating that all 
citizens, not merely a privileged few, should benefit from 
development. Recognizing that an increase in productivity 
required infrastructure as a major input, the second plan (1967- 
71) continued the first. This five-year plan continued the high 
priority on infrastructure projects.[Ref. 63] 
The growing inequity in the income distribution was 
perceived as a threat to internal stability from spreading 
insurgency, so the third plan (1972-76) widened its emphasis to 
accommodate socially and politically oriented objectives. 
Regional development programs from the first two plans were 
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greatly expanded, particularly in the northeast. To formally 
recognize the importance of social development, the word 
"social" was added to both the plan and planning agency. They 
became the National Economic and Social Development Plan and the 
National Economic and Social Development Board (NESDB), 
respectively.[Ref. 64] Thailand's economic downturn resulting 
from the oil crisis during the first three years of the third 
plan led policymakers to emphasize economic recovery in the 
fourth plan (1977-81). Since the insurgent activities had been 
increasingly intensified, rural development programs also 
received high attention. 
The fifth plan (1982-86) addressed the issues of income 
distribution and social instability in a more systematic 
fashion. The plan established "targeted areas" for special 
assistance in 264 districts and subdistricts. Social services 
were to be greatly expanded in these areas.[Ref. 65] Another 
important aspect of the fifth plan was its emphasis on 
decentralization. Decentralization referred to expanding growth 
and industrial investment to provincial areas. Industrialization 
had been excessively concentrated in BMR. However, the real 
focus of the plan was on the Eastern Seaboard Project, a large 
government-supported industrial complex designed to become an 
alternative  to  Bangkok  as  an  urban-industrial  location. 
[Ref. 66] 
The sixth plan (1987-91) recognized that social inequality 
was becoming an increasing challenge in the development process. 
The plan aimed at maintaining high economic growth and helping 
low-income populations in both urban and rural areas to gain a 
larger share of the benefits from development. Similar to the 
fifth plan, an "Urban and Specific Zone Development Program" was 
established to assist people in BMR and urban slums. In rural 
areas, the targeted zones were not limited to only areas 
threatened by insurgency, because this threat had subsided. 
Therefore,  the "Rural Development Program" was opened to 
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nationwide eligibility. However, because of the economic boom, 
the plan was revised after it had been in effect for two years. 
The revision promoted exports through greater competitiveness in 
world markets. As for decentralization, the revision recommended 
expanding industrial investment to regional and rural areas. But 
unlike the fifth plan, the government did not map out any 
industrial complex projects. Instead, it called for the private 
sector to play a bigger role in the process.[Ref. 67] 
After experiencing the 1987-1990 breakneck growth, 
policymakers have added another dimension to the seventh plan 
(1992-96). In addition to the two traditional objectives of 
maintaining economic growth and redistributing income to 
regional and rural areas, the plan is designed to develop human 
resources and to preserve environmental and natural resources. 
[Ref. 68] A series of measures to reduce poverty and income 
inequality are proposed in the plan. These measures include 
improving production productivity, marketing and price support 
programs, and decentralizing industrial activities to provincial 
areas. In addition, human resources will be strengthened through 
education [Ref. 69]. Compulsory schooling will be increased from 
six to nine years. The government will also encourage the 
private sector to play a bigger role in providing higher 
education. 
2.  Causes of the Mixed Results 
The economic and social development plans have produced 
mixed results in redistributing income to regional and rural 
areas. Several reasons contribute to this conclusion. The 
primary objective of all the economic and social development 
plans is to raise the country's standard of living. To achieve 
this objective, the plans pursue two broad goals: attaining high 
economic growth, and redistributing wealth to regional and rural 
areas. Thailand's economic performance over the past 30 years 
indicates that the first goal has been met, largely through 
industrial development financed by the private sector. Since 
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private financial institutions are largely independent of 
government control, investment patterns which normally follow 
market-determined patterns do not necessarily follow a pattern 
that matches government income distribution planning [Ref. 70]. 
Thus, industrial investment and growth are heavily concentrated 
in a few major cities, particularly Bangkok. Economic 
concentration becomes a major challenge to redistributing wealth 
to provincial areas. 
In addition, some plans fall short of either establishing 
strong policies or allocating government expenditures toward an, 
equitable income distribution. The NESDB does not control the 
budget. Initiatives, recommendations and programs proposed by 
the agency in the plans are not always transferred into 
ministerial operational plans. This link in the implementation 
process is further weakened by the country's political 
instability. No elected government has ever completed a four- 
year term since the country adopted a constitutional monarchy in 
1932. Either coups or dissolutions of parliament bring the 
government to an end. Consequently, the administrations that set 
out initiatives and programs in drafting the plans do not 
generally implement them. 
Moreover, no single political party has ever gained a 
majority in parliament since the first general elections were 
held in 1933. Coalition governments, involving as many as six 
parties, are inevitable. Based on the ratio between ministerial 
posts and the total members of parliament in the coalition 
parties, ministerial quotas are assigned to the parties. 
Government policy statements are usually viewed as prepared by 
the coalition's leading party. In addition, capturing more seats 
in the next elections is the major concern of all parties. 
Because of these perspectives, there is no real sense of unity 
among the coalition parties. Each coalition party usually runs 
ministries under its own policies and quite often discredits 
other parties. This action is further fueled by public opinion 
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which normally gives credit to or blames a particular party, not 
the government as a whole, for accomplishing or failing to run 
a ministry. 
The country's political instability, initial state of 
development and impacts from the global economy hindered long- 
term planning. Prior to the 1990s, the government focused on 
short-term problems to cope with economic pressure, some from 
external factors. For example, the swift increase in oil prices 
caused the government to redirect its efforts during the third 
and fourth plans, emphasizing controlling inflation and putting 
the country's economy back on the high growth track. Economic 
concentration was not recognized as a national policy issue 
until the fifth plan. Although this plan emphasized expanding 
industrial activities beyond BMR, the government limited its 
attention almost exclusively to the Eastern Seaboard Project. 
Furthermore, most of the government's efforts had to be 
redirected to address macroeconomic problems caused by the 
global recession and second oil shock. Besides the Eastern 
Seaboard Project, decentralization did not make much progress in 
the fifth plan. The 1987-90 economic boom and the NIC status 
highlighted the Thai economy and, at the same time, took away 
most of the decentralization efforts. The sixth plan focused 
priority on maintaining high economic growth. By the end of the 
1980s, the shortfalls of infrastructure and education had become 
significant drags on the economy, making it difficult to sustain 
long-term growth and expand the industrial base to provincial 
areas. 
Based on the relative-ineguality approach, the growing 
income gap between the urban rich and rural poor implies that 
the government has failed to accomplish the plans' second goal: 
redistributing wealth to regional and rural areas. However, from 
the early 1960s to the mid 1980s insurgency in rural areas was 
the major national security issue. Concerning redistribution of 
wealth, the government's real intention was not to narrow the 
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income gap, but rather to reduce the country's poverty. To 
battle the insurgency, the government committed more energy and 
effort to rural development programs, aiming to improve the 
standard of living in rural areas. Since insurgent activities 
were localized and largely limited to remote areas, these 
policies did not have large impact on industrial development in 
BMR and other urban areas. Thus, two different kinds of 
development having two different goals have been simultaneously 
carried out for almost 30 years. Development in urban areas was 
led by the private sector; development in rural areas was led by 
the public sector. 
If results from private and public development are compared 
against each other as in the relative-inequality approach, a 
widening income gap between urban and rural residents should not 
be unexpected. This is because these programs have different 
objectives. On the other hand, considering the absolute-poverty 
approach, the government has actually achieved both goals of the 
plans. It has been able to maintain high economic growth and 
significantly reduce poverty in the country. 
The threat from the insurgency has faded from the national 
arena since the mid 1980s. Rural development programs have 
prepared provincial areas for more advanced development. As the 
Thai economy matures, the significance of short-term problems 
has been overshadowed by the need for long-term planning. This 
is reflected in the seventh plan (1992-96). Policymakers have 
broadened the goal of redistributing wealth to regional and 
rural areas. The goal now aims to reduce the country's poverty 
and to narrow the income gap between the urban rich and rural 
poor. 
C.  REDISTRIBUTION OP INCOME 
The seventh plan has three major objectives: maintaining 
economic growth; redistributing income to regional and rural 
areas;  and  developing  human  resources  and  preserving 
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environmental and natural resources. Within the context of this 
thesis, only the redistribution of income and human resource 
development are relevant. In this section, two approaches to 
income redistribution will be discussed: industrial 
decentralization schemes and rural development programs. Human 
resource development will be discussed in the following section. 
1.  Industrial Decentralization Schemes 
A deep-rooted cause to the growing inequality in Thailand 
is economic concentration. Bangkok alone accounts for almost 
half of the country's gross domestic product. Industrial 
activities, financial institutions and exporting markets have 
been heavily concentrated within BMR. Several factors contribute 
to this phenomena. These include transportation costs, volume of 
production, access to public utilities, labor effectiveness and 
distance from government offices, all of which favor Bangkok and 
its vicinity [Ref. 71]. 
Successive Thai governments have tried to distribute the 
country's wealth by encouraging industry to move to provincial 
areas. The Board of Investment (BOI) is the major instrument for 
implementing this policy. Established in 1954, BOI is the 
principal government agency that provides investment incentives 
in Thailand. Between 1960 and the end of June 1989, the board 
granted promotional certificates to 5,045 projects, involving a 
total investment of 802 billion baht and 1,303,249 new jobs 
[Ref. 72]. However, most of the investment was concentrated in 
only some major cities, particularly Bangkok. 
Since 1989, BOI has classified the country into three 
investment zones: Zone I includes Bangkok and its five adjoining 
provinces; Zone II includes 10 other prominent provinces in the 
central region; and Zone III includes the rest of the country. 
Projects in Zone I receive the smallest tax benefits; projects 
in Zone III receive the highest. [Ref. 73] In an attempt to 
accelerate decentralization, beginning in April 1993, the board 
offered additional  import-duty exemption and extended tax 
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holidays to investors who are willing to locate factories 
outside Zone I. As a result, the board received 1,121 
applications during the last nine months of 1993, up from 444 
projects in 1992. Applications in Zone III leaped from 170 to 
801 projects. The board granted promotional privileges to 523 
applications for projects in Zone III in 1993, compared with 166 
projects in 1992. In contrast, it approved 193 projects in Zone 
I and 136 projects in Zone II in 1993.[Ref. 74] 
The slow progress in diverting investment away from Bangkok 
and its vicinity results in part from the lack of infrastructure 
in provincial areas. Inadequacies in the telephone network, 
transportation system and power generation grid increase the 
operating costs of factories located outside Bangkok. These 
additional costs can outweigh tax incentives obtained from the 
promotional privileges. Although the government has continuously 
invested in infrastructure projects, most of these projects 
provide the basic infrastructure needed to increase agricultural 
productivity. Infrastructure to support the country's long-term 
industrial growth has been overlooked and underdeveloped. For 
example, in 1990 Thailand had 1,192,808 telephone lines, 
representing only 2.2 lines per 100 population. Bangkok alone 
accounted for almost 70 percent of these.[Ref. 75] 
The government has been focusing on redistributing wealth 
to provincial areas, in part by expanding infrastructure 
networks. Several projects strengthening transportation links 
between provincial areas and ports on the Gulf of Thailand are 
being implemented. But the most challenging task for the 
government is to expose its state utility and transport 
enterprises to free market competition. Realizing that private 
capital and professional management were essential for Thailand 
to maintain economic growth, the concept of privatization was 
introduced to the state enterprises in the early 1980s. However, 
strong resistance from state enterprise unions and other vested 
interests stalled the move for several years. To avoid political 
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confrontation, the government's solution has been to gradually 
privatize activities that require large capital or sophisticated 
technology through franchises, concessionary arrangements and 
new shareholding structures [Ref. 76]. Out of 50 some state 
enterprises, the privatization battle has focused on four: the 
Telephone Organization of Thailand (TOT), the Communication 
Authority of Thailand (CAT), the Electricity Generating 
Authority of Thailand, and Thai Airways International. Thus far, 
TOT and CAT have been fairly successful in privatizing and 
expanding their services to meet aggressive targets set by 
NESDB. Although they will not likely to meet the target of 10 
telephone lines per 100 people by the end of the seventh plan, 
the line-penetration ratio has substantially increased from the 
2.2-per-100 ratio in 1990.[Ref. 77] 
The regionalized promotional policy and expanding 
infrastructure networks will help decentralize economic 
concentration. However, the increase in projects requested and 
approved in Zone III alone cannot measure the success of the new 
policies. Among 969 projects granted promotional privileges by 
BOI between 1992 and the first quarter of 1994, only 386 
applicants have come forward to get promotional certificates. 
Among these, only 200 projects are underway. Furthermore, most 
of the projects are concentrated in a few major provinces that 
already have strong industrial bases and good infrastructure 
services. Out of 523 projects approved in Zone III in 1993, only 
112 projects are located in the northeast. If all these projects 
become operational, they will create about 30,000 new jobs for 
the region's 10-million labor force. Furthermore, more than half 
of these projects are located in Nakorn Ratchasima, the region's 
most industrialized province [Ref. 78]. Thus, the growing 
inequality in Thailand is not likely to fade away in the near 
future. 
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2.  Rural Development Programs 
There is no doubt that rural development programs have 
reduced poverty levels in Thailand significantly. Although the 
programs were insufficient and ineffective during the early 
stages, they were catalyzed by internal security threat. The 
August 1965 gunfire in northeast marked the beginning of a long 
and bitter armed struggle in Thailand. Insurgent activities were 
most wide spread in the northeast, north and south, 
respectively. This led to an increase in security spending and 
the regional planning to improve living conditions in rural 
areas. The government did not gain the upper hand over the 
situation until the late 1970s when it shifted its emphasis from 
armed suppression to civic action. "....[T]he Royal Thai 
Government recognized the village-level problems that the 
insurgency could have turned to its purposes, gradually 
blanketed the insurgent areas with development programs and 
benefits, and restaffed and retrained the cadre of district 
officers."[Ref. 79] By 1985, the armed struggle was virtually 
ended. 
The government, however, has continued supporting rural 
development programs. These programs have helped restore and 
maintain internal security and build infrastructure that 
provides the private marketing system low-cost access to 
farmers. As presented in Chapter IV, the northeast' had the 
lowest average household income in the country, but showed the 
greatest improvement between 1986 and 1992. This can be 
attributed to the "Isaan Khiew," or Green Northeast Project. The 
five-year project was launched in March 1987 to provide adequate 
water and irrigation services and reduce income inequality in 
the region. The Royal Thai Army coordinated the NESDB, academic 
institutions  and  business  community  in  this  project 
[Ref. 80]. 
Although domestic security has been restored and poverty 
levels in rural areas have been substantially reduced, the 
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government still strongly supports rural development. This is 
reflected through expenditures allocated to regional and rural 
areas in the current economic and social development plan. In 
1992, central agencies (ministries and their division-level 
units) received a total budget of 269 billion baht. By 1995, 
their budgets have fallen to 225 billion baht. During the same 
period, the regional agency budgets (provinces, districts, 
subdistricts, communes and villages) have increased from 193 
billion baht to 490 billion baht [Ref. 81]. In addition, the 
government encourages the private sector to increase its role in 
rural development. Several organizations and firms have located 
small factories in rural villages to produce low-technology 
consumer goods. With a strong emphasis from the public sector 
and more participation from the private sector, the country's 
poverty level should continue to decline. 
D.  HUMAN RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT 
The education system in Thailand can be divided into three 
broad levels: primary, secondary, and tertiary. All levels of 
education are provided mainly by the public sector. Six years of 
primary-level schooling are compulsory and over 90 percent of 
primary students attend public schools. Secondary education is 
divided into lower and upper divisions, each consisting of three 
years. In 1985, approximately 88 percent of secondary students 
were enrolled in public schools. The role of private education 
at this level has been declining over time; average standards 
are  lower  in  private  schools  than  in  public  schools. 
[Ref. 82] 
Vocational education has been extensively developed since 
the early 1980s. The secondary curriculum has been shifting from 
traditional university preparation to more applied labor market 
skills. Vocational training is now incorporated into the primary 
and secondary curriculum. In addition, vocational and technical 
programs are offered in the upper division of the secondary 
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level and in post-secondary education. 
To support the country's economic growth, tertiary or 
higher education has expanded greatly in the 1990s. The number 
of public "closed" colleges and universities that provide 
education at undergraduate and graduate levels has increased 
from 12 institutions in 1985 to over 60 institutions today. 
However, these institutions can accommodate only a small 
percentage of the students who want to continue at this level. 
Therefore, most tertiary students are enrolled in "open" 
universities. The country's two open universities account for 
over 80 percent of students enrolled at institutions of higher 
education.[Ref. 83] 
Thailand has invested substantially in education. This is 
reflected in expenditures on education. This has been one of the 
highest areas of public spending. The country's adult literacy 
rate -at about 9 0 percent- is one of the highest in Southeast 
Asia. The educational system in Thailand is not inadequate, but 
it is inequitable. In the early 1990s, only 10-15 percent of the 
children in provincial areas continued in the secondary level. 
This compares with over 8 0 percent in Bangkok. In another 
estimate, 14 percent of children from farm families attended 
secondary schools; this compares with 96 percent from middle and 
upper class families. Unequal access to the educational system 
is another cause of the growing income gap between the urban 
rich and rural poor. Educational disparity is leading to greater 
income inequality because those with only a primary education 
are increasingly excluded from the higher-paying jobs in the 
manufacturing and service sectors.[Ref. 84] 
The widening income gap and a severe shortage of skilled 
workers during the rapid growth in the second half of the 1980s 
sparked policymakers to revise the country's education policies. 
The seventh economic and social development plan extends 
compulsory schooling from six to nine years. The government has 
committed to attaining this goal.  Between 1993 and 1995, 
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expenditures on education accounted for approximately 19 percent 
of the total budget and was the highest area of public spending. 
For fiscal year 1996, expenditures on education will increase to 
20.4 percent of the total budget, comfortably leading the 
second- and third-ranked expenditures (social services and 
national security) which account for 13.4 percent and 13.0 
percent, respectively [Ref. 85]. The percentage of students who 
continued in the lower secondary level reached 75 percent in 
1993 and 90 percent in 1994 [Ref. 86]. With this impressive 
record, the government plans to officially announce nine-year 
compulsory schooling in 1996 [Ref. 87]. 
In March 1995, the government approved plans to encourage 
private investment in schools, universities and worker training. 
In these schemes, concessionary financing will be provided to 
investors who want to build secondary schools, colleges and 
universities outside BMR. In addition, these investors are 
eligible for low-cost land and tax breaks. To boost the skills 
of people already in the labor force, tax breaks and tax 
exemptions will be provided to companies that start in-house 
training programs or send their employees for further training 
in educational institutions. 
The highlight of the new education and training schemes is 
a loan program for poor students. This will be the country's 
first student loan program. The loan covers tuition and fees, 
books and living expenses for up to seven years -three years of 
upper secondary school and four years of higher education. In 
return, students repay the principal and 1-percent interest over 
a period of 15 years, beginning two years after completing their 
studies.[Ref. 88] 
As industrial activities expand to provincial areas, more 
higher-paying jobs will become available to rural residents. 
Farm households will now have higher expected gains from extra 
schooling. Three to six additional years of secondary school are 
no  longer  seen  as  doing  little  to  improve  children's 
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productivity as farmers. Although it is too soon to expect 
results from education, at least serious attempts are being 
implemented to address the long-term growing income inequality 
between the urban rich and rural poor. 
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■VI.  SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATION 
A.  SUMMARY OF THE STUDY 
Results of the study are summarized as followed: 
1. By using the relative-inequality approach, income 
patterns in most developing countries during the course of 
economic development follow the inverted U-shaped hypothesis 
suggested by Kuznets in 1954. The hypothesis implies that as 
per-capita income in a developing country rises, its inequality 
may initially rise, reach a maximum, remain stable at an 
intermediate level of income, and then decline as income reaches 
levels similar to those in developed countries. By contrast, the 
absolute-poverty approach gives a different perspective to the 
distribution of income. Results from the absolute-poverty 
approach indicate a substantial reduction in poverty level 
during the early stage of development. 
2. Over the past 3 5 years, income structures and poverty 
levels in Thailand have generally followed the same patterns as 
most developing countries. Taking the relative-inequality 
approach, the study shows a growing income inequality between 
different groups of the population. In Thailand, this was 
evident between agricultural and industrial sectors, urban and 
rural areas and among different regions. Residents in the 
Bangkok Metropolitan Region have received the largest benefit 
from development, where as residents in the northeast have 
received the smallest share. As a result, BMR's residents have 
been pulling further ahead of the rest of the country; the 
northeastern region has been falling further behind. However, 
the poverty levels in Thailand, whether expressed as a percent 
of the total population or in absolute terms, have been 
significantly reduced. Interestingly, the greatest reduction in 
poverty has occurred in the northeast. 
3. Different results obtained from the two approaches are 
explained by two main factors: natural resource endowments and 
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the effects of government policies on income distribution. 
Growth patterns and income structures in each region, especially 
in the agricultural sector, are primarily determined by natural 
resource endowments. These regional and sectoral endowments are 
either strengthened or weakened by government policies. 
The National Economic and Social Development Plan 
establishes overall economic goals, guidelines and directions 
for both the public and private sectors. All seven economic and 
social development plans share the common objective of raising 
Thailand's standard of living. Two broad goals are set to 
achieve this objective. One is to attain high economic growth, 
the other is to redistribute wealth to regional and rural areas. 
The first goal has been carried out by the private sector mainly 
through industrial development; the second goal has been carried 
out by the public sector mainly through rural development 
programs. 
The market-determined investment patterns in the private 
sector, combined with the country's political instability, the 
lack of infrastructure networks in provincial areas and 
education shortfalls in rural areas have led to a high economic 
concentration in a few major cities, particularly Bangkok. 
Thailand's economy has been performing exceptionally well. 
However, a relatively large share of national output is 
generated within these industrial cities. Thus, the goal of high 
economic growth has been achieved, but with a growing income gap 
between urban and rural residents. 
In the public sector, the country's political instability 
and constant pressure from the global economy and oil crises 
limited government objectives during the first six plans. They 
were unable to map out a long-term plan to sustain growth and to 
expand the industrial base to provincial areas. Because of the 
threat from the insurgency, the government was determined to 
reduce poverty rather than narrowing the income gap. Rural 
development programs were the key to combating the insurgency 
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and rural poverty. Although the threat from the insurgency has 
faded since the mid 1980s, the government continues supporting 
these programs. These programs have pushed millions of the rural 
population out of poverty. At the same time, they provide these 
rural ares with basic needs and services to stand ready for 
future industrial development. In this sense, the government has 
also accomplished the goal of distributing wealth to regional 
and rural areas. 
As Thailand's economy has matured and the country has 
ensured internal security, the government is now interpreting 
the term, "redistributing wealth" as both reducing poverty and 
narrowing the income gap. While rural development programs 
remain the key instrument for fighting poverty, two strategies 
are being implemented to narrow the income gap. One is to expand 
industrial activities to provincial areas and the other is to 
upgrade the educational system by providing rural children 
better accessibility to higher education. 
B.  RECOMMENDATION 
It is too soon to predict the outcome from the government's 
latest efforts to obtain a more equitable society. If the 
decentralization schemes work well and the industrial base 
expand to provincial areas, better-paying jobs will be available 
for rural residents" in the industrial and service sectors. With 
better education and skills, these rural workers should be able 
to effectively transfer from agriculture to other sectors. 
However, income inequality might remain the top national policy 
issue. 
Thailand is quite different from the four Asian NICs. With 
the exception of South Korea, these countries have relatively 
small populations and limited natural resources. As they 
transform to industrial societies, only small portions of their 
population remain in the agricultural sector. For Thailand, even 
if the transformation from agrarian to industrial society goes 
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smoothly, the country's agricultural sector will remain 
relatively large. Thailand has rich natural resources and a 
large population. The increase in Thailand's agricultural output 
has been largely secured through increasing the cultivated area. 
A much lower growth in the output has been observed in the past 
several years because uncultivated land is nearly depleted. The 
government relies mainly on diversification schemes to increase 
productivity in the agricultural sector. However, it will be 
difficult for the agricultural sector to match the growth in the 
industrial and service sectors through diversification schemes 
alone. Yields per acre of all major cash crops are still 
relatively low. Besides the diversification schemes, farmers 
need a technology breakthrough to increase their productivity. 
Research programs conducted by several government agencies have 
not increased agricultural yields. While industrialization is 
being promoted in provincial areas, the government should also 
direct more energy and resources to research and development in 
agriculture. 
Thailand's economic development has generally followed the 
pattern described by the inverted U-shape hypothesis. It will be 
interesting for future studies to see if the current 
government's efforts will help stabilize the income distribution 
as predicted by Kuznets over 50 years ago. 
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